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REPLY BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION 
[. INTRODUCTION: THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
This appeal from the Board and Division of State Lands and 
Forestry arises from a decision jointly made and executed by those 
agencies1 [hereafter jointly identified as "State Lands"] to dispose 
of a state "school section" lying within a scenic and remote portion 
of Capitol Reef National Park by accepting Garfield County's propos-
al to exchange that section for other lands owned by the County. 
Because the parties1 first exchange of briefs has argued a wide 
range of disparate issues bearing on this matter, consideration of 
the issues may be aided by highlighting and focussing the central 
questions presented. They include an important question about stand-
ards governing management and disposition of state school lands 
which happen to possess important scenic, natural and recreational 
values, as well as two significant and related questions about 
public administrative practice. 
Validity of flexible management designed to seek protection for 
public values consistently with basic trust obligations 
The fundamental substantive question presented is whether the 
acknowledged duty of State Lands to protect the trust interest in 
state "school sections" compels approval of proposals for profitable 
disposition of those lands without regard for the presence of 
important noneconomic values, otherwise legally protected, that 
could be preserved by other feasible management alternatives. The 
1
 The Board's major role in critical aspects of the decision 
process and the Division's participation in an advisory rather than 
decision-making role are summarized, with detailed citation to the 
administrative record, in discussing the jurisdictional question at 
7-9, infra. 
State has argued that a rigid and confining concept of trust 
obligations foreclosed consideration of these additional public 
values• 
NPCA responds that trust management obligations did not require 
approval, and would have permitted State Lands to defer disposition 
in favor of interim or other management options that would protect 
this land. The case law relied on by the State announces broad 
principles in the context of questionable dispositions. But not a 
single case holds, or even implies, that requirements for management 
of trust lands would have been violated by avoiding or deferring 
this land exchange while developing other management alternatives 
more compatible with the legal protections otherwise afforded this 
land. On the other hand, at least one important case, Utah v. 
Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995 (CD. Utah 1979), holds that school trust 
obligations should be harmonized with relevant protective policies 
(for wilderness) by recognizing a realm for application of 
regulatory protections, while requiring regulation to remain 
compatible with basic trust interests. 
NPCA contends that the various legal standards and protective 
policies applicable to this land, including the Board's policy on 
"Management of Sensitive Areas," imposed a duty on State Lands to 
identify, and based on proper findings to implement, modify or 
reject, protective management alternatives to the extent compatible 
with school trust obligations. 
Need for relevant findings 
For the above reasons, the second significant question 
2 
•resented by this case concerns the scope of proper administrative 
.nquiry and findings. Specifically, did State Lands, in acting to 
iispose of these unique school section lands, comply with the basic 
requirement that administrative agencies develop and make findings 
or statements of reasons that address the relevant factual and legal 
considerations? The State argues that the Division Directorfs 
"findings," for the first time disclosed to NPCA and this Court with 
the State's answering brief, satisfies requirements for findings and 
reasons. 
NPCA contends that the limited findings prepared by the 
Director (and only recently disclosed) failed to address most of the 
issues raised by this exchange. Not only did those "findings" fail 
to identify or address the substantive issues argued by NPCA. They 
failed even to address issues central to application of the 
standards acknowledged by the Director in his related declaratory 
ruling. 
Right of affected citizens to effective participation 
The third significant question in this case is whether 
interested citizens and citizen groups, upon proper showing of 
standing and relevant substantive concerns, are entitled to 
participate in proceedings involving disposition of school lands. 
May State Lands lawfully exclude affected citizens and dispose of 
state lands through exclusive negotiations between the agency and 
the purchaser? The State has contended that these transactions are 
intended to embrace only the negotiating parties, and that 
intervention is foreclosed. 
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NPCA contends that it was unlawfully denied effective 
participation in this exchange proceeding, despite the fact that its 
standing and the relevance of its substantive interest in this 
matter were clear, uncontested, and even admitted by the agency. 
Not only are due process concerns implicated by denial to citizens 
of fair opportunity for effective participation. Equally important 
is the impact on the substantive validity of agency action. Here it 
is apparent that State Lands1 failure to address important issues 
resulted, at least in part, from its refusal to permit effective 
presentation of those issues in its exclusive "negotiation" 
proceedings. 
Declaratory rulings — particularly questioning State Lands1 
appraisal practices 
Finally, this case presents other questions significant in the 
management and disposition of state school trust lands, particularly 
issues relating to the validity of appraisal procedures. The State 
argues that the Director properly declined to respond to requests 
for declaratory rulings on appraisal procedures because NPCA had 
shown no basis for an interest in those issues. 
NPCA contends that its requests for declaratory rulings were 
highly relevant to the issues presented by this exchange, 
particularly its request for a ruling on the propriety of State 
Lands1 practice of relying on appraisals paid for and supplied by 
the proponent of a sale or exchange. That practice seems, at best, 
strangely in conflict with State Lands' repeated invocation of 
unbending duty to honor school trust obligations. 
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EI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The State's arguments questioning the availability of 
judicial review have already been addressed. The challenges to this 
Court's jurisdiction, as previously shown, do not rest on proper 
interpretation of governing statutes and fail to recognize the 
Board's deep involvement in making the challenged decision. 
NPCA's standing is based on substantial interests not contested — 
actually acknowledged by the Director — which it is entitled to 
protect in these proceedings. 
2. Although its standing and the relevance of the concerns it 
sought to present were never contested by State Lands, NPCA was 
unlawfully denied intervention or other meaningful or effective 
participation in these land exchange proceeding^. 
3. Contrary to the State's contentions, t^ PCA has not argued 
that legal and policy protections for public values on state school 
lands "abrogate" school trust obligations. But NPCA does contend 
that those protections can and must be accommodated, where otherwise 
feasible, by implementing management alternatives that are 
reasonably compatible with trust obligations. 
(A) State Lands does not seriously contest the fact that 
the Capitol Reef state section and adjacent Iannis have been 
recognized by National Park designation and in Rational Park Service 
management plans for their unique scenic beauty, pristine natural 
character, and important recreational opportunities. 
(B) The scenic, natural and recreational values of the 
Capitol Reef section and adjacent lands are subject to protection 
5 
under policies derived from several legal sources including the 
nonimpairment requirements of the National Park System Organic Act, 
Utah's statutory multiple use policy for management of state lands, 
public trust concepts, and the values recognized by the Boardfs own 
policy statement on "Management of Sensitive Areas." 
(C) Decisions affecting this state school section must be 
governed by these applicable protective policies insofar as they can 
be implemented through management alternatives that are reasonably 
compatible with school trust obligations. 
4. Despite availability of compatible management options, the 
exchange decision was based on a rigid concept of school trust 
obligations to "maximize" current economic return that precluded 
consideration of those protective options. 
5. The case law on trust management obligations neither holds 
nor suggests that it would be inconsistent with school trust 
obligations for the agency to exercise its management duties by 
deferring current profitable disposition of a school section while 
developing management alternatives adequate to protect unique public 
values on those lands. 
6. Although the public values of this state section were 
beyond dispute, State Lands made no inquiry and prepared no findings 
to address the feasibility of protecting those values compatibly 
with trust interests. The limited administrative findings prepared 
in support of this exchange fail to address or consider application 
of the relevant protective standards; fail to address even those 
elements relevant to application of the standards articulated in the 
6 
Director's declaratory ruling; and fail to make any findings 
concerning the feasibility of accommodating any of these standards 
tfith school trust management principles. 
7. As argued in NPCA's request for declaratory rulings, an 
appraisal independent of the proponents for a sale or exchange 
should be required by both school trust standards and state 
statutory requirements. 
III. ARGUMENT 
1. Availability of Judicial Review 
(A) Jurisdiction. With respect to the jurisdictional issues, 
NPCA relies upon Petitioner's Memorandum In Opposition To 
Respondents' Motion For Summary Disposition at 1-6. In addition: 
(a) The State's reliance on the 1988 amendments to this 
Court's jurisdictional statute (Brief of Respondents at 16 n.12) is 
strained, at best, since all relevant actions took place in 1987 
and this appeal was taken prior to the amendment. If the 1988 
amendment limiting direct review of the Board to "formal" 
proceedings is relevant at all, then related procedural inadequacies 
must also be considered. Although the new Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act requires designation by rule for a matter to be 
treated as an "informal" rather than "formal" proceeding, Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-4, the Board had adopted no rules for designation 
until 1988, after these proceedings were completed. (Brief of 
Respondent at 19.) 
(2) The decisions challenged by this petition are reviewable 
because Utah Code Unannotated § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii) authorizes direct 
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review by this Court of Board decisions. The State acknowledges that 
under Adkins v. Board of State Lands and Forestry, 719 P.2d 524 
(Utah 1986), the Board should not have exercised any decisional role 
because "the Division alone is authorized to make administrative 
decisions for the management and disposition of state lands." Brief 
of Respondent at 16. But the State's argument apparently rests on 
the fiction that the Board did comply because it should have 
complied. To the contrary, the record demonstrates the Board's 
central role in critical aspects of the decision process, as well as 
the Division's advisory rather than decision-making role. The 
Division's memorandum to the Board analyzing the exchange proposal 
was clearly cast as a guide to decision by the Board, even to the 
extent of summarizing decisional alternatives followed by a "Staff 
Recommendation" favoring "Alternative No. 4 — to approve the 
concept of an exchange . . . ." Board Memo dated July 27, 1987, 
items G and H, pp. 5, 6 [R.35-36] The Board also debated the merits 
of the specific decision at length before acting on "the Staff's 
recommendation . . . that the exchange be approved as to concept 
subject to further evaluation"; and the Board then unanimously 
approved a motion to "approve the Staff's recommendation." Minutes 
of Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, p. 3 0 (Sept. 11, 
1987)(emphasis added). [R.54] Similarly, the Director's formal 
action approving the exchange expressly rested on the premise that 
"the Board approved the concept of exchanging State land described 
as [the disputed state section]." Record of "Formal Action" by 
Director of the Division of State Lands and Forestry, p. 13 (Dec. 
8 
21, 1987). [R.89] 
(B) Standing: NPCA relies upon its prior Submissions in 
Petitioner's Memorandum In Opposition To Respondents' Motion For 
Summary Disposition at 6-12. In addition, it should be emphasized 
that even the Director of the Division recognized NPCA's standing in 
this matter, specifically holding that he was required to respond 
to NPCA's declaratory ruling request #7 because "NPCA has provided 
adequate information relative to NPCA's stake in the resolution" of 
the proposed exchange. Response to declaratory iruling requests by 
letter dated Dec.21, 1987, from Division Director Patrick D. Spurgin 
to Chris Wangsgard, p.2. [R.84] 
(C) Scope of Review: Under Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. 
Pub. Serv. Com'n, 658 P.2d 601, 608 (1983), this Court should apply 
the standard of "correction of error" in reviewing State Lands' 
errors in interpretation of school trust management obligations and 
their relationship to other legal policies protecting public values 
on school lands. That test also should govern in determining 
whether the agency identified the requisite issues of law for its 
findings, Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Pub. Serv. Com'n, 
636 P.2d 1047, 1058 (Utah 1981), while the logic or completeness of 
those findings should be reviewed under the rationality test, 658 
P.2d at 611. 
2. NPCA was unlawfully denied effective participation in these 
"negotiated" exchange proceedings 
In denying intervention, the Director nowhere challenged the 
adequacy of NPCA's interest or basis for standing. Thus, the effect 
of the Director's ruling, if permitted to stand, is that parties 
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with concrete interests and credible substantive concerns will be 
unable to protect those interests in State Lands1 exchange 
proceedings, regardless of how severely they may be affected. That 
result is clearly contrary to this Court's continuing concern that 
parties injured by agency proceedings have a fair opportunity to be 
heard. Cf. R.W. Jones Trucking, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 
649 P.2d 628 (1982), relying on Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public 
Service Commission, 99 Utah 28, 96 P.2d 722 (1939) and Armored 
Motors 3Service v. Public Service Commission, 23 Utah 2d 418, 464 
P.2d 582 (1970); Utility Consumer Action Group v. Public Service 
Commission, 583 P.2d 605, 608 (1978), cited approvingly in Utah Dept 
of Admin. Services v. Public Serv. Commission, 658 P.2d 601, at 608, 
n. 8 (1983) . 
The State suggests that NPCA's effort to intervene in these 
exchange proceedings was "untimely." Brief of Respondent at 45. But 
the State does not explain why a detailed request, submitted more 
than two months before final action on this exchange, should not 
have been honored. Letter styled "Petition to intervene" dated Oct. 
14, 1987, from Terri Martin and Chris Wangsgard to the Board and 
Director of State Lands and Forestry. [R.61-64 ] The only 
explanation offered was the Director's assertions, in his letters 
dated Nov. 16, 1987, to Terri Martin and Chris Wangsgard, that — 
the Division . . . has no procedures under which a request 
for intervention in . . . an exchange proposal might be 
granted. . . . [A]n exchange application . . .is not 
viewed as an adjudicative action under present law. 
Rather, it is in the nature of a proposal for negotiation 
. . . [for] a mutually beneficial transfer of property . . 
. dependent on the willingness of the parties to trade . . 
. . At present, we see no basis for interjection of a 
10 
third party into such a negotiation process. 
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[TJhe State cannot unduly speculate that such conditions 
[net economic benefit from protective management] are 
present . . . [and] current information compels the 
conclusion that failure to proceed with an exchange which 
would result in an increase in the value of the State 
trust land inventory (as is the case with the lands 
offered by Garfield County) woul d be a breach of trust 
dutv. rr* f '•! 
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he would "welcome any information related to the value of the 
affected properties or any alternative which you may have to offer.11 
Brief of Respondents at 46. Letters from Division Director Patrick 
D. Spurgin to Chris Wangsgard and NPCAfs Terri Martin dated Nov. 16, 
1987. [R.94,95] 
At that time, however, neither the "net economic benefit" 
standard, nor any other, except rote "maximization" of value, had 
been acknowledged. And a month earlier NPCA had requested 
interpretive rulings on the applicable standards, specifically to 
guide its participation and submissions. Letter styled "Requests 
for Declaratory Rulings" dated Oct. 14, 1987, from Terri Martin and 
Chris Wangsgard to the Board and Director of State Lands and 
Forestry. [R.65] At the same time, NPCA had specifically requested 
a short deferral of proceedings so that it might consider the 
Division's view of the governing standards in preparing any further 
proffer. Letter styled "Petition to intervene" dated Oct. 14, 1987, 
from Terri Martin and Chris Wangsgard to the Board and Director of 
State Lands and Forestry, p. 4. [R.68] 
These circumstances highlight the importance of (then) Judge* 
Burger's observation in Office of Communication of the United 
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), that— 
The theory that the Commission can always effectively 
represent the listener interests in a renewal proceeding 
without the aid and participation of legitimate listener 
representatives fulfilling the role of private attorneys 
general is one of those assumptions we collectively try to 
work with so long as they are reasonably adequate. When 
it becomes clear .. . that it is no longer a valid 
assumption which stands up under the realities of actual 
experience, neither we nor the Commission can continue to 
rely on it. 
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reason, it is essential for the Board — and lacking that, for this 
Court to require the Board — to recognize these protective legal 
policies and give them appropriate weight in seeking management 
alternatives that can accommodate school trust principles. 
At a minimum, the Board here was required to identify the 
applicable protective policies and make relevant findings on the 
feasibility of, and degree to which, compliance with these policies 
could be achieved consistently with the legal requirements of trust 
management. 
Not only did the Board fail to consider the extent to which 
protective policies were applicable or could be accommodated. It 
also failed to make findings on many critical issues discussed infra 
at 30-33. But even if the governing standards were no more 
protective than those asserted in the Director's "declaratory 
ruling" in this matter fR.85-871, the findings offered in this case 
(and belatedly incorporated in the record) fail to address critical 
issues identified by that ruling. Rather, despite the Director's 
recognition in his declaratory ruling of criteria for decision at 
least partially responsive to the protected values of these lands, 
the record discloses no inquiry and no findings addressing key 
issues posed by those criteria. 
Indeed, only with the State's answering brief were NPCA or this 
Court advised that any administrative findings were made in support 
of the decision to approve this land exchange. Brief of Respondents 
at 8, 53. 
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(A) The undisputed scenic, natural and recreational values of 
the Capitol Reef state section are protected under several 
legal standards that must be accommodated with school 
trust management obligations 
serious/, dispute, tlie in--* mat * -e Japiuoi l^ ee ^tait =-.^L^ .. 
ni«.rirr.^ ontirej • "ipd-jri^ *^ "if-itoi F^er Natior^i 
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Division Director ::s r^ JatP'i io'isio* '^ MI / r request:; • or 
descriptjLw. , .w./^ v-w. 
between the rear- - impacts .1( j * proffered Interests is 
deciaia- . . . , - .equests by setter dat^a Dec,.?i <•*..... 
sion Dir^ f't ir Patrick D, Spir 2 ' ' \\i Wanqsqar * - rR.85] 
2 > o I "i!" I 
miner delays/ * ..»es not i.i.spiru U-CA'^ i.r,
 W . escr^ption . ' /e 
let of Respondents at 3, n. 5, suggests that the summary 
of the Park's 1982 General Management Plan indicated significant 
development in the area of the state section, including, e.g., a new-
road. The State failed to recognize that the summary on which it 
relied merely referred to one of the alternative plans analyzed in 
the EIS, not the "preferred" plan approved by the Park, See Capitol 
Reef FEIS General Management Plan, Statement of Findings at iv and 
26, 28. The State also argues that the state section is not within 
official wilderness recommendations, but does not dispute that the 
adjacent park lands north and south of the section are recommended 
for park wilderness. The 1987 Park Service statement cited by the 
State emphasizes reason for concern about this section, explaining 
that "the MPS can exercise little formal control over these lands 
and, potentially, uses of the lands could occur that would have a. 
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"scenically spectacular and strategically critical location" of the 
section within Capitol Reef National Park, or its relationship to 
adjacent areas, both north and south, that are recognized by the 
National Park Service for their wilderness and recreational values. 
Brief of Petitioner at 9-10• 
(B) Legal standards derived from several sources protect the 
important scenic, natural and recreational values of the 
Capitol Reef section, subject to accommodation with trust 
obligations 
NPCA has previously submitted substantial argument that the 
scenic, natural and recreational values within and adjacent to the 
Capitol Reef state section are within the scope of legal protections 
afforded by: (i) the National Park Service Organic Act and its 1978 
amendments [Brief of Petitioner at 35-37]; (ii) Utah's statutory 
multiple use policies [Brief of Petitioner at 37-38]; and (iii) 
common law "public trust" obligations to protect unique natural 
values [Brief of Petitioner at 38-44]; and (iv) the Board's own 
1984 policy statement on "Management of Sensitive Lands" [Letter 
dated Dec. 18, 1987, from Chris Wangsgard and Terri Martin to the 
Board and Director of State Lands and Forestry, pp. 3-4 [R.78-79]; 
Brief of Petitioner at 54-55.] (Attached as Appendix A.) 
The Board's own policy statement on "Management of Sensitive 
Areas"3 constitutes a clear recognition of the obligation to seek 
negative impact on adjoining parklands." Capitol Reef National Park, 
Statement for Management at 28. (July 1987; emphasis added). 
3
 The terms of the statement, including its lack of specific 
enforcement provisions, appear to meet the definition of "policy" in 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-2 (10)(a), rather than that of a "rule" 
under subsection (13) which would require valid rulemaking 
procedure. State Lands has offered no showing that this policy had 
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NPCA, however, has never contended that these protective 
policies override or abrogate school trust policies. Rather, we 
contend that it is the duty of decision makers to seek management 
alternatives that will give effect to these protections while 
accommodating the requirements of trust management. Under that 
view, school trust principles do not automatically or 
comprehensively override other valid protective policies; and these 
protective policies are displaced only to the degree that reasonable 
management programs cannot develop other protective alternatives 
that are compatible with basic school trust obligations. 
It is essential, then, for the decisionmaker to recognize these 
protective legal standards and give them appropriate weight in 
seeking management alternatives that are also reasonably compatible 
with school trust principles. That is exactly the position taken by 
the Court in Utah v. Andrus, 486 F.Supp. 995 (CD. Utah 1979), 
relied on by State Lands. Brief of Respondents at 35. Far from 
recognizing any unqualified state right to develop school trust 
lands, the Court pursued an approach that sought to "resolve the 
issues and effect a balance of interests" based on analysis of the 
interest involved and its statutory base. 486 F.Supp. at 1001. 
In Utah v. Andrus. the owner of mining claims on state school 
trust lands and the Utah Division of State Lands (as intervenor) 
defended against claims brought by the Bureau of Land Management for 
injunctive relief against road construction through a "wilderness 
study area" (WSA). The mining claimant and the State urged that 
statutory and regulatory protections for WSAs could not interfere 
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accommodate them to the basic school trust obligations, suggests a 
much different resolution of the instant case than that reached by 
State Lands. Unlike Utah v. Andrus, there were many unexplored 
management options here that could have preserved the protective 
policies and values without significant intrusion on the value of 
the trust lands held by the State. But neither inquiry nor findings 
were addressed to those possibilities, 
4. Despite availability of compatible management options, the 
exchange decision was based on a rigid concept of school trust 
obligations to "maximize" current economic return that precluded 
accommodation with reasonable protective options. 
State Lands' decision to proceed with the exchange was 
rationalized on the basis of a rigid and incorrect view of its trust 
obligations which foreclosed any consideration of reasonable 
management options that would accommodate protections for the 
Capitol Reef section with trust concepts. Both the limited 
administrative findings and other significant portions of the 
record, as well as the State's brief, justify this exchange on the 
ground that the Board and Division were obligated to disregard 
available exchange options or other more protective management 
alternatives because of a duty to maximize current return on current 
trust assets. 
The Division Director's findings, belatedly offered in support 
of the exchange decision, made it clear that this rigid viewpoint 
led State Lands to decline consideration of other more protective 
management alternatives, such as deferral of disposition pending 
development of a State-Federal exchange: 
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[W]hile there may be certain non-economic values on the 
land, the State can affirmatively act to preserve and 
protect those values only if there is a net economic 
benefit to the school trust that will be realized by such 
protection. In accordance with trust duties, the State 
cannot unduly speculate that such conditions are present; 
and no information has been presented to indicate that the 
conditions are in fact there. On the contrary, current 
information compels the conclusion that failure to proceed 
with an exchange which would result in an increase in the 
value of the State trust land inventory (as is the case 
with the lands offered by Garfield County) would be a 
breach of trust duty. 
Statement On The Exchange Of Land Between The Division Of State 
Lands And Forestry And Garfield County Related To The Switchbacks 
Section Of The Burr Trail at 3. (No attribution and undated.) 
[R. 97] That position also obviously led State Lands to the 
incorrect assumption that it had no independent obligation to 
develop information and options that might include more protective 
alternatives. 
Earlier, the Division's recommendations to the Board explicitly 
relied on the same rigid view as the basis for disregarding the 
alternative of a State-Federal exchange pursuant to the then-recent 
Memorandum of Understanding between the State and the Interior 
Department: 
FLPMA requires value for equal value exchanges, but trust 
duties suggest that from the trust perspective some 
additional, non-speculative benefit to the trust must be 
realized. Also, as noted, benefits must be maximized. So 
long as benefits of the MOU exchange are assumed, they do 
not support the completion of the exchange. Until 
selected lands are finally identified, it is difficult 
for the Board to determine whether the MOU is ultimately 
consistent with trust duties. In fact, it will be well 
into the BLM evaluation process before the true 
feasibility of the exchange of many of the selected lands 
will be clear. 
Accordingly, the status of the MOU exchange, even if it is 
assumed to conflict with the Garfield County exchange, 
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does not presently provide a basis for denying the 
application submitted by the county. 
"Board Memo" dated July 27, 1987, p 4. [R.34]; Minutes of The 
Regular Meeting Of The Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, Sept. 
11, 1987, p. 23. [R.47].(Emphasis added.) That analysis was 
apparently the basis for disregarding the State-Federal land 
exchange policy and mechanisms established in the MOU, because even 
the Board Memo recognized that "in several respects existing policy 
does not apply to this proposal." Board Memo at 6. [R.36] 
The notion that other management alternatives were precluded by 
a requirement that the exchange return a current short-term net 
benefit was reflected in other advice from the Division. Expressly 
recognizing that, "with the exception of exchanges such as the MOU 
exchange," land exchanges are ordinarily initiated by interested 
third parties, the Division advised: 
Accordingly, exchanges almost always arise due to, and are 
motivated primarily by, benefits sought by an outside 
party. There is, therefore, a credible argument that an 
exchange of value for equal value is a breach of the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty unless some other net benefit is 
realized by the trust in the exchange. 
Board Memo at 3 [R.33]; Minutes at 22. [R.46](Emphasis added.) The 
demand for an immediate net benefit apparently relied on the related 
view, expressed in the same Memo, that the Board's fiduciary duty 
included — 
a duty of loyalty, i.e., the Board must strive to benefit 
the trust beneficiaries and may not have, as its purpose, 
the benefit of a third party (particularly when no net 
benefit is realized by the trust) 
Board Memo at 3 [R.33]; Minutes at 21. [R.45] Obviously, that 
position gives no consideration to possibility that the extrinsic 
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"benefits" may arise from the need to accommodate other statutory 
obligations of protective management, rather than the conflicting 
interests of a third party. 
A similar, and even more rigid expression of the "maximization" 
duty was asserted by the Director, also in discussing the exchange 
alternative under the State-Federal MOU, in a letter dated Sept. 23, 
1987, to Tom Hatch, Chairman of the Garfield County Commission: 
The MOU provides administrative guidelines for exchanging 
State lands which are entrapped within Federal 
reservations for Bureau of Land Management lands. The MOU 
does not and cannot change substantive principles which 
are applicable to trust land management. Those principles 
require that we seek maximum benefit for the trust 
beneficiaries. 
[R.58] (Emphasis added.) The Director's response to NPCA's 
requests for declaratory rulings, though expressed in somewhat less 
strident terms, nevertheless adopts the same approach: 
To the extent that there exist several options for dealing 
with trust property and the protection of non-economic 
values is necessary for maximizing the economic value of 
the property, such protection may be prudently undertaken. 
Declaratory ruling # 7, p. 5. [R.87] (Emphasis added.) 
Under the regime of this interpretation, it is evident that no 
weight is given to the principles recognized in Utah v. Andrus, 
supra, which seek to accommodate applicable protections for unique 
public values with trust obligations. Crucially missing from the 
Director's ruling — and from the view that dominated State Land's 
decision in this case — was any recognition that short-term 
dispositions were not required where development of management 
alternatives could be developed that would accommodate both the 
protective and trust management obligations. 
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5. School trust principles do not foreclose protective 
management alternatives. 
The rigid view of "trust" obligations on which State Lands 
rationalized its approval of this disputed exchange and its failure 
to consider alternative management options is neither compelled nor 
suggested by the case law on which the State relies. Not only would 
that approach foreclose reasonable accommodation with other policies 
affecting trust lands. If taken at face value, it would also 
handicap rational efforts to adopt strategies of trust management 
that consider long-term as well as short-term economic prospects, or 
reflect adequate consideration of future as well as current 
beneficiaries of the trust. 
Under its rigid rationale, State Lands purported to find a duty 
to approve Garfield County's exchange proposal because it was 
obligated to obtain a "net economic benefit" from the proposed 
exchange transaction, and because opponents had failed to show that 
greater "net economic benefit" would arise from any alternative 
course. [R.97] Unexplained, but a necessary part of that position, 
was an unarticulated conclusion that trust obligations impose a 
rigid preference for current disposal rather than retention and 
alternative management of trust lands whenever an opportunity arises 
that will yield the requisite "net economic benefit." 
The confining rigidity of that approach is well-demonstrated by 
the declination to consider management options that would preserve 
other important protected values while working out arrangements for 
the State-Federal exchanges contemplated by the MOU, only recently 
executed between the State of Utah and the Department of the 
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Interior. The recitation in the Director's "findings" that "the 
State cannot unduly speculate" that "net economic benefit" would 
arise from other, more protective management options [R.97] 
obviously drew on the similar views expressed in the Division 
staff's recommendations to the Board. The staff had opined that "so 
long as benefits of the MOU exchange are assumed," they do not meet 
the requirement that "benefits must be maximized," and that "until 
selected lands are finally identified, it is difficult for the Board 
to determine whether the MOU is ultimately consistent with trust 
duties." Minutes at 23. [R.47] On that basis, the Division 
concluded that "the status of the MOU exchange, even if it is 
assumed to conflict with the Garfield County exchange, does not 
presently provide a basis for denying the application submitted by 
the county." Id. 
Initially, it should be observed that the above rationale, if 
taken at face value, would almost always compel preference for 
current dispositions over longer-term management options. State 
Lands could seldom hope to work with certainties in developing 
management options that look to future rather than current values. 
Under that view, then, State Lands would be compelled to favor most 
current dispositions over interim or longer-term planning; and it 
would be severely inhibited, if not prevented, from choosing 
flexible management options designed to achieve a range of valid 
management objectives. In addition to foreclosing efforts at 
accommodating trust principles with protected public values on trust 
lands, these heavy restrictions on the management options for school 
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lands would constrain efforts to anticipate future land values or to 
benefit future members of the open class of trust beneficiaries. 
NPCA submits that none of the cases relied upon by the State 
support this rigid view of school trust obligations or foreclose 
consideration of interim or longer-term management options that may 
include accommodation of protected public values. None of the cases 
even involved challenges to interim management judgments which 
favored retention over disposition or deferred disposition in favor 
of developing alternative management options. 
NPCA's first brief emphasized that all of the cases on which 
the State relies for establishment of trust duties involved 
challenges to the propriety of disposition actions by which trust 
lands had been diverted wholly or in substantial part from trust 
holdings. Brief of Petitioner at 45-46. The same remains true of 
the State's answering brief. Thus, for example, the key case of 
Lassen v. Arizona Highway Department. 385 U.S. 458 (1967), dealt 
with grants of materials sites and rights of way on school trust 
lands to the state highway department without compensation. The 
Court held that those dispositions required compensation to the 
trust, though it waived certain of the rigid enabling act 
requirements for determining the amount of compensation and 
permitted use of any procedures "reasonably calculated to assure the 
integrity of the trust." 385 U.S. at 465. 
The Supreme Court's focus on the propriety of or values 
received from dispositions is also demonstrated by Alamo Land & 
Cattle Co. v. Arizona. 424 U.S. 295 (1976), where the dispute 
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concerned proper distribution of condemnation compensation between 
the state trust fund and a lessee of the condemned state lands. 
Strangely, in fact, Alamo can be taken as recognizing that other 
legal obligations do give rise to other legal interests that may 
qualify trust interests. Thus, the Court held that, despite rigorous 
limitations on dispositions arising from the specific provisions of 
the relevant enabling act, property law defining the lessee's 
interests entitled the lessee to a portion of the condemnation 
judgment reflecting its leasehold (as distinguished from the trust's 
reversionary) interest in the property. 424 U.S. at 306-07. 
Although it involves use of trvist lands for a park, the 
significance of State v. University of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807 (Alaska 
1981), is also relevant only as a limitation on dispositions. 
There, the state legislature had disregarded the trust status of 
certain lands and had included the land in establishing a state 
park. Holding that disposition could not simply disregard the land's 
trust status, the Court rejected the state's argument that it could 
simply take the land for park purposes under it4 general multiple 
use authority. Finding inverse condemnation in favor of the trust 
beneficiary, the court remanded the case for appraisal of value. 62 4 
P.2d at 816. Nothing in the case, however, suggests that interim 
management to preserve the land pending development of advantageous 
alternatives would have offended the trust. 
Cases like Oklahoma Ed. Ass'n v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 (Okla. 
1982) are obviously confined to improper dispositions, as are the 
27 
Utah and other state cases cited in the State's brief, ^  and offer no 
basis for relevant refinements of their generalized recitals of 
broad trust principles. 
Although, NPCA does not dispute the relevance of common-law 
trust principles in assessing the validity of decisions in managing 
school trust lands, the State has failed to identify the nature of 
the school trust under the common law. The United States Supreme 
Court as well as this state's attorney general have characterized 
school land grant trusts as charitable trusts. See Springfield 
Township v. Quick, 63 U.S. 56 (1859) (enabling acts create trusts 
similar to private charitable trusts); Trustees of Vincennes 
University v. State of Indiana, 55 U.S. 268 (1852) (same); Informal 
Op. No. 85-62 Utah Att'y Gen. 12 (1985) ("It is clear under [Utah 
law] . . . that the land grant trust is a 'charitable trust."1). 
A charitable trust differs from a traditional private trust in 
that the benefits it provides are "intangible advantages to mankind 
b
 Jensen v. Dinehart. 645 P.2d 32 (Utah 1982) involved a 
dispute over allocation of current mineral income from trust lands 
between the State School Fund and the Uniform School Fund. Coleman 
v. Utah State Land Board, 17 Ut. 2d 14, 403 P.2d 781 (1965) merely 
affirms the Board's action in putting mineral leases on newly 
acquired land up for public bidding rather than awarding a lease to 
the first applicant. Duchesne County v. State Tax Commission, 104 
Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335 (1943) determined that property acquired by 
the trust pursuant to foreclosure on investment of trust funds was 
held by the Land Board in a governmental capacity and was thus 
exempt from property taxation by the county. Finally, in Ebke v. 
Board of Educational Lands and Funds, 154 Neb. 244, 47 N.W.2d 520 
(1951), the lands in question were to be disposed by renewal of 
leases, and the only question was whether the price should be set 
through public bidding requirements or in compliance with state 
statutes that provided for renewal of leases on trust lands based on 
6 percent of an arbitrarily determined fair market value. The Court 
held that the latter method would be incompatible with obligations 
to the trust. 
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or some considerable class thereof which improve its condition 
mentally, morally, physically or in some similar manner.11 G. Bogert, 
The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 363 at 17 (2d. Ed. 1978). Quite 
often, as is the case with Utah's school trust, the class receiving 
the benefits of the charitable trust constitutes an open class: the 
trust obligation runs to future as well as present beneficiaries, 
because the purpose of the trust is to bestow a benefit to society 
rather than to specified individuals. Since this is so, the trustee 
of such a trust "must be concerned both with income for current 
beneficiaries and the preservation of trust assets for future 
beneficiaries." Informal Op. No. 85-62 Utah Att'y Gen. at 12; see G. 
Bogart supra § 541 at 157. In its present posture, the instant case 
does not require a determination of the extent to which that duty 
may require specific consideration of scenic, natural and 
recreational values; but the nature of the duty certainly emphasizes 
that the trustee is not obliged to dispose of trust assets as soon 
as an economic opportunity becomes available. Thus, the trustee may 
wait for a better opportunity in the future without violating the 
trust obligations. See Informal Op. No. 85-62 Utah Att'y Gen. at 
13; McCormack, Land Use Planning and Management of State School 
Lands, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 525, 545-56. 
Contrary to its narrow view of its duties, then, the Board had 
no duty to proceed with the Garfield exchange. 
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6. Although the public values of this state section were beyond 
dispute. State Lands made no inquiry and prepared no findings to 
address the feasibility of protecting those values consistently with 
trust interests. 
Under the approach suggested above, then, it is obvious that 
State Lands should have considered a variety of management 
alternatives that would have been more compatible with valid 
protective standards than this land exchange. As NPCA argued to the 
Board [R.52], and as the Division [R.31] and Board [R.43] also 
expressly recognized, a detailed framework and procedure for 
developing land exchanges between the State, BLM and the Park 
Service had just been established under a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the State of Utah and the Department of the 
Interior dated May 19, 1987. [Attached to this brief as Appendix 
B.] 
In addition to the MOU provision to facilitate State-Federal 
exchanges, the Secretary of the Interior also has clear authority to 
carry out individual land exchanges to resolve inholdings within 
Capitol Reef National Park, subject to agreement by state or local 
entities. 16 U.S.C.A. § 273a (1974). 
Similar options are recognized by the Board's policy on 
Management of Sensitive Lands, discussed supra at 16-17. Yet the 
administrative record, including the Director's belated "findings," 
demonstrate that — to the extent such protective alternatives were 
explored at all — they were rejected in favor of the immediate 
proposal on the basis of a rigid and incorrect view of school trust 
obligations. 
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Furthermore, the Director failed even to make findings 
necessitated by his own declaratory ruling on standards for 
management of the school trust. While NPCA has already explained 
its disagreement with his interpretation, it is obvious that key 
aspects of that ruling would require consideration of a number of 
factors basic to any good-faith application of the director's own 
tests. His declaratory ruling by letter dated Dec. 21, 1987, from 
Patrick D. Spurgin to Chris Wangsgard, at p. 5 [R.87 ], would 
require consideration of least the following factors: (1) Whether 
preservation of this state section's scenic, aesthetic and 
recreational resources was likely to generate economic advantage, 
derived from activities associated with this or other trust lands 
that are dependent upon that preservation; (2) What activities may 
generate that economic advantage, and to what extent; (3) Over what 
term would the economic benefits be realized, and to what extent 
would preservation yield future economic benefits for future 
("open") beneficiaries as compared to current beneficiaries; (4) 
What activities associated with the lands acquired by exchange were 
likely to generate economic advantage, to what extent, and over what 
term? (5) Whether more advantageous answers to these questions 
would result from exchanges arranged with the federal government 
under the framework for resolving the patchwork of state trust lands 
provided for by MOU between the State and the Interior Department. 
The failure to respond meaningfully with appropriate findings 
on any of the issues suggested above reflects a fundamental failure 
to fulfill the basic requirements of administrative practice 
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prescribed by this Court in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah 
Public Service Comiaission. 636 P. 2d 1047 (Utah 1981), Invalidating a 
PSC order that had provided for interim application of a "senior 
citizen's rate" in distributing the cost of a UP&L rate increase, 
this Court held that the PSC had failed to provide findings and 
reasons that would support the classification established by the 
rate. The Court was concerned that the agency's rate had been 
developed without considering a number of key factors necessary to 
explain the lines drawn by its classification, and had failed to 
make findings that would support inference about those factors. The 
Court emphasized the well-recognized requirement of findings and 
reasons in terms fully applicable to the concerns raised by NPCA in 
this case: 
Although the Commission exercises a form of 
legislative power in rate making, it is not the same as 
the Legislature. The legality and the legitimacy of its 
order rest on well-articulated findings and reasons which 
are in accord with governing law. In administrative 
matters such as this, there must be findings on all 
material issues. [Citations omitted.] Only then can the 
interests of the public, the ratepayers, and the utility 
be protected. Furthermore, it is not possible for this 
Court, without such a foundation, to perform its assigned 
task of judicial review. [Citations omitted.] 
Perhaps a senior citizen class can be sustained; 
however, it is not for this Court to "supply a reasoned 
basis for the agency's action that the agency has not 
given . . . " [citation omitted]; nor are we authorized to 
make findings not made by the Commission. We are 
compelled to concluded, therefore, that the order is 
unlawful because there are inadequate findings of fact to 
support it. 
636 P.2d at 1058. Also see Committee of Cons. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. 
Com'n, 595 P.2d 871, 878 (1979); Williams v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 29 
U.2d 9, 504 P.2d 34.36 (1972). 
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To comply with its obligation to provide relevant reasons for 
decision and related findings, State Lands should have fully 
investigated all reasonable management alternatives for this land 
which present less risk than the proposed exchange to values on this 
land protected by other applicable policies. Its findings should 
have identified the management alternatives that would comply with 
those protective policies, as well as the effect of those 
alternatives on the short and long term benefits available to the 
school trust, together with any other relevant considerations that 
would affect the compatibility of those alternatives with trust 
interests. In particular, rejection of more protective alternatives 
such as management to effectuate state-federal exchanges under the 
the MOU with the Interior Department should have been based on 
detailed findings that demonstrate the incompatibility of that 
alternative with the long as well as short term interests of the 
trust. 
7. A declaratory ruling is badly needed with respect to State 
Lands1 appraisal practices 
NPCA relies on its prior contentions in Brief of Respondents at 
52-55, except to emphasize that the rigorous "trust obligation" 
thesis on which the State relies seems strangely in conflict with 
its practice, reflected in the record of these proceedings, of 
relying on property appraisals supplied by the applicants. The 
importance of and legal basis for that concern is suggested by 
NPCA's arguments to the Director in its requests for declaratory 
rulings. See Letter dated Oct. 14, 1987, from Terri Martin and Chris 
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Wangsgard to the Board and Director, State Lands and Forestry, pp 4-
6 [R,68-70] 
Dated = 2$%**y /fgf 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for the National Parks 
and Conservation Association 
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DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY 
SURFACE POLICIES 
1966 through December 1986 
TABLE OF CONT£N'7S 
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1.900 State Land Investmert 
SECTION 2 - RANGE MANAGEMENT 
2.100 Rentals 
2.110 Competitive with BLM and FS 
2.111 Reflect current fair market value 
2.112 1985 Grazing Fees 
2.113 Adjustment of Grazing Permit Fees 
2.114 Adjustment of Fees of State Lands 
2.115 Credits 
2.120 Due Date Adjusted to March 1st 
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•ECTION 1 — SURFACE MANAGEMENT continued 
general ruling as to our position on bankruptty as far as further 
leases and that the Board review it for a polic^ matter." 
The Board also recommended to the Staff that they look again at the 
fair-market value to firmly establish a fair rejntal. 
1.600 MANAGEMENT OF SENSITIVE AREAS 
June 14, 1984 « The staff recommended the adoption of the 
following or a similar policy. 
It is the intent of the Board of State Unds and Forestry to 
capture maximum multiple-use benefits from t|he lands entrusted to 
the Board and the Division to manage. In the majority of cases, it 
is the wish, and experience, of this Board tljiat several uses of the 
property can be made at any point in time with a minimum amount of 
problems. It becomes overwhelmingly evident, however, that on 
certain State lands unique values to society may overrule the 
economic benefits to the trust and may be valued enough by society 
to merit designation for perpetuation and preservation of those 
values at the cost of other competing, non-cpmpatible uses. 
It is the desire of this Board to expand its flexibility in 
accommodating the special management needs of these resources, and 
the Board requests that the Director explore possible alternative 
methods or processes in which lands could b^ devoted to the single, 
non-economic uses while maintaining the integrity of the trust. 
The alternatives may include, but are not lijmited to, the following: 
(1) Purchase of subject property at faijr-market value by other 
entities of the private sector or State or federal Government. 
(2) Exchanges of land to other State, Federal, or local agencies 
or other parties who would have the desire and capability of 
managing lands containing the resources in need of special 
management. 
(3) Explore the potential for the exchanbe of sovereign lands for 
trust lands, thereby providing more flexibility in managing kthose 
lands. 
(4) Explore legislative solutions consistent with the trust 
responsibility which would allow for a land-bank concept which 
might remove areas in need of sensitive management from the trust 
inventory to be replaced by other lands Which could be managed more 
consistently with the trust responsibilities. Under this concept, 
school trust lands that justify management for special non-economic 
producing uses could be exchanged with lands in the "bank" which 
may more appropriately be managed in a manner consistent with 
school trust requirements. The areas needing special management 
would no longer be subject to the trust requirements, and the most 
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SECTION 1 ~ SURFACE MANAGEMENT continued 
appropriate agency or entity to provide this special management 
could be sought and the lands made available through lease, sale, 
or exchange. 
The Board complimented the Director on this proposed policy. They 
suggested some small editorial changes, which have been 
incorporated into the above policy, and felt it should be approved. 
Rattle / St. John. Unanimously approved. 
"I move we approve this with the editorial changes incorporated." 
1.700 GENERAL MANAGEMENT PLANS 
1.710 July 10, 1986 Dixie Planning Unit -- The Staff discussed with 
the Board the draft Dixie Planning Unit General Management Plan, 
which had been previously sent to the Board for their review. Mr. 
Kappe noted that the new Cultural Resources Policy approved by the 
Board in this meeting will be incorporated into this plan before 
sending for public comments. Mr. Williams, of the Board, noted 
that there are some minor revisions that need to be made, but he 
would like to see the public comments before making these. 
Peart / Bates. Unanimously approved. 
MI move we approve this." 
1.711 September 12, 1986— The Draft Management Plan for the Dixie 
Planning Unit has been distributed for public and agency comment. 
Two public meetings were held. The one held August 5 was for local 
government officials only, and the one held on August 7 was a 
comment-solicitation meeting for the general public. The results 
of both meetings, which listed comments received on the Draft 
Management Plan, were given to the Board. In several Instances, 
substantive changes are proposed to the Draft Management Plan as a 
result of comments received at the public meetings or from the 
written comments which were received. These recommended changes 
are: 
1. Page 12, Recommendation regarding Coordination of Grazing With 
Special Use Leasing: 
Proposed Language: On those lands where a development lease 1s 
granted, wherever possible the developer will allow livestock 
grazing on lands under lease until grazing becomes incompatible. 
In those instances where the rancher has made approved capital 
Improvements under his grazing permit prior to approval of the 
development lease, the developer may be required to reimburse the 
permittee for the depreciated value of the improvements. 
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THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
AND 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
WHEREAS, Federal reservations within the State of Utah contain many 
thousands of acres of lands administered by the State for the support of 
the common schools and other State institutions; and 
WHEREAS, land management policies within Federal reservations 
severely limit the State's ability to manage State ir^ holdings so as to 
generate revenues for the school trust fund; and 
WHEREAS, the Department of the Interior is committed to cooperating 
with the State of Utah in providing for the exchange of State school and 
sovereign lands within Federal reservations for Federal lands 
administered by the Bureau of Land Management within the State of Utah, 
recognizing that the exchanges will enhance and inprove the management of 
the National Park System and Department of Defense military reservations; 
and 
WHEREAS, through State and Federal cooperation, the removal of State 
school and sovereign lands from Federal reservations could be 
accomplished administratively; and 
WHEREAS, the completion of such exchanges is ani appropriate and 
necessary policy and objective of both the State anjj the Department of 
the Interior; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Department of the Interior and the State of Utah 
do hereby agree: 
1. As a program objective that removal of State lands from Federal 
reservations in Utah is in the best public interest. 
2. To complete the removal of State lands from these reservations as 
expeditiously as possible, preferably within 18 months of the execution 
of supplemental agreements necessary to facilitate specific exchanges. 
OTsaiAAltf ffi 
3. To negotiate iirmediately exchanges in accordance with the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act exchange procedures or applicable 
National Park Service exchange authorities, and the applicable State 
processes. 
4. To utilize appraisal and valuation concepts, such as those 
developed in the in-lieu selection process, designed to expedite the land 
transfers and appraisal reviews, to the extent legally and 
administratively acceptable. 
5. To promote consultation between appropriate agencies of the 
Department of the Interior, the Department of Defense, the State of Utah, 
and the Navajo Tribe necessary to facilitate the orderly selection and 
exchange of lands and to ensure the views of all affected agencies, 
parties, and members of the public are considered in the exchange process. 
6. To develop supplemental agreements, as needed, to further 
define procedures and responsibilities associated with matters such as 
valuation, cost sharing, environmental concerns, planning requirements, 
and other issues as determined by parties to the exchange. 
7. That the State inholdings include all State interests in the 
following areas, acreages of which will be determined by the Bureau of 
Land Management and the State of Utah after consultation with all 
affected parties including, where appropriate, the National Park Service 
or responsible agencies of the Department of Defense: 
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area 
Arches National Park 
Capitol Reef National Park 
Dinosaur National Monument 
Dugway Proving Grounds 
Wendover Bombing and Gunnery Range 
Camp Williams 
8. That State inholdings within the Navajo Indian Reservation will 
be considered for removal in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 2 of 
the Act of March 1, 1933 (47 Stat. 1419) and under procedures and 
timeframes to be mutually determined by the Bureau of Land Management 
and the State of Utah after consultation with the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs and appropriate Tribal officials. 
9. To continue to explore possibilities for consolidating State 
and Federal land ownership to enhance both State and Federal land 
management opportunities. 
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FURTHER, the Secretary agrees: 
1. To consider making available to the State through this exchange 
process those lands on the extremities of and within tjhe Glen Canyon 
National Recreation Area identified in the Recreation Area master plan as 
available for disposal. 
2. To commit the funding and personnel in the department of the 
Interior necessary to complete the exchanges within lk months subject to 
appropriations. 
3. That there may be some unique values on the State lands within 
parks and monuments that may warrant consideration for an adjustment in 
the exchange process to the extent allowed by law. Such an adjustment 
may be based on evidence that may be presented by the State, and shall be 
reviewed by the Bureau of Land Management and, where park lands are 
involved, by the National Park Service. 
4. That the exchanges will be negotiated and implemented by the 
Bureau of Land Management in consultation with the National Park Service 
and the Department of Defense. Since the National P£rk System benefits 
from exchanges within parks and monuments, the National Park Service will 
reimburse the Bureau of Land Management for part of the administrative 
costs of effectuating such exchanges, with the State also paying part of 
the cost. The Secretary will pursue similar cost sharing agreements with 
the Department of Defense for exchanges benefitting management of 
military reservations. 
5. That if the Bureau of Land Management and the State have 
disagreement on the respective values of the lands proposed to be 
exchanged, the Department of the Interior will establish in the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary - Land and Minerals Management, an expedited 
dispute resolution process that will handle and resolve these valuation 
disputes within 45 days. 
AND, the State of Utah agrees: 
1. To coordinate directly with the Bureau of Land Management in 
selecting lands so as to avoid, to the extent practical, issues which 
would hinder the exchange process or compromise the Bureau of Land 
Management's ability to effectively manage lands ahd resources under its 
jurisdiction. 
2. To commit the funding and personnel, including the payment of 
certain administrative costs associated with the selections and 
exchanges, and determined to be necessary to accomplish the objectives of 
this agreement, such payment to be delineated in a future agreement. 
TUteiAdt X iQ 
3. To take tncse actions prudent and necessary to expedite the 
selection and exchange of lands, including full cooperation with the 
Secretary in meeting the requirements of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act and other applicable statutes and in satisfying the need 
for environmental considerations, public participation, and the 
development of acceptable appraisal procedures. 
ENTERED INTO this (?«• day of 1987 
#Pfrl&L^ 
NORMAN H. BANGERTER, GOVERN 
STATE OF UTAH 
yyuUcf 
DONALD P. HODEL, SECRETARY 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
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